Authors analyzed the method and conceptual constitution of C. Geertz’s interpretive anthropology. They categorize it as a positively-oriented discipline aiming to explanative conclusions. The scheme of conceptual formation is explicated. Concepts of interpretive anthropology are deduced from the relevant aggregates of phenomena. Consequently, the scope of concept becomes identical to the content of representation. Authors expose the nature and essence of ―empirical universals‖. They assert that C. Geertz reduces the formation of conceptual apparatus to the arrangement and interaction of representations. The specificity of the concept of meaning deployed by C. Geertz is demonstrated. He explicates the ―return of meaning‖ through clarification of nature of social meanings, in showing their structure and the way of their interaction with the inner experience of social actor. So, the sense of ―the return of meaning‖ is its emergence as an objective component and constitutive part of outer social experience. Moreover, the concept of meaning and the process of internalization of conventional social meanings are constitutive for culture itself. Authors arrive to conclusion that the scheme of conceptual constitution does not fit with the concept of meaning, which is generic derivative of subjective hermeneutical logic and is hardly coherent with the established objective scheme of concept determination. That is why interpretive anthropology could hardly bind together inductive method of concept formation and the logic of meaning. Consequently, all universal / particular difficulties are centered around the concept of meaning.
Volume 12 | 07-Special Issue
Pages: 370-375
DOI: 10.5373/JARDCS/V12SP7/20202118